{ "$schema": "https://calm.finos.org/release/1.1/meta/calm.json", "unique-id": "poc-hypergraph-incident-response-fabric", "name": "PoC Shared Domain Hypergraph - Incident Response Fabric", "description": "A FINOS CALM (tm:finos-calm) v1.1 architecture of the cross-industry, private incident-response fabric. Insurers, insured enterprises, agent runtimes, standards bodies, and the PoC evidence layer collaborate on attributed, privacy-bound incident response. Controls are keyed to Standards Anchor Registry (tm:) slugs; every node/relationship is followable to a standard clause (std:) via the crosswalk.", "metadata": { "channel": "djat-poc-hypergraph-20260716", "modeling_language": "tm:finos-calm", "integrates_with": "Pathways encodings (hypergraph-pathways/) + Trust Key deep links (poc-hypergraph://)", "poc_construct": "tm:poc-cv-standard" }, "nodes": [ { "unique-id": "insured-enterprise", "node-type": "actor", "name": "Insured Enterprise", "description": "An organization deploying agentic AI whose security posture is underwritten. Seals incidents privately and exposes conformance tiers to the fabric." }, { "unique-id": "ciso", "node-type": "actor", "name": "CISO / Security Team", "description": "Human principals who file private incident reports and honor response requests on behalf of the insured enterprise." }, { "unique-id": "insurer", "node-type": "actor", "name": "AI Insurer / Underwriter", "description": "Prices AI risk from attributed, verifiable incident evidence rather than claim-based assurances. Realizes tm:aiuc-1.", "metadata": { "insurance_bifurcation": "AI-embracing side" } }, { "unique-id": "assessor", "node-type": "actor", "name": "Independent Assessor", "description": "Accredited third party who attests conformance tiers. Verifies Trust Keys offline; does not need issuer platform access." }, { "unique-id": "agent-runtime", "node-type": "system", "name": "Agentic AI Runtime", "description": "The boundary-crossing agent whose actions must be made evidenceable. The subject of the vulnerability lifecycle.", "controls": { "zero-trust-access": { "description": "Authenticate and authorize every agent request (NIST SP 800-207).", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:nist-sp-800-207", "config": { "sdg_domain": "authorization", "node": "authorization:access_decision" } } ] }, "least-privilege": { "description": "Minimal capability grants; expansion is a non-delegable act.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:anthropic-zt-agents", "config": { "sdg_domain": "authorization", "node": "authorization:least_privilege" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "tool-gateway", "node-type": "service", "name": "MCP / Tool Gateway", "description": "Filters and mediates agent tool access; introspects MCP to do tool filtering. Where tool-misuse (ASI02) is contained.", "controls": { "mcp-tool-filtering": { "description": "Filter which tools an agent may reach (OWASP AISVS MCP Security).", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:owasp-aivss", "config": { "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:mcp_security" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "tee-enclave", "node-type": "system", "name": "TEE / Confidential Compute Enclave", "description": "Attests the execution environment was untampered; a mechanism the evidence layer builds on.", "controls": { "enclave-attestation": { "description": "Attest enclave integrity as an input to signed evidence.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:confidential-computing-tee", "config": { "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:tee_control" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "poc-evidence-layer", "node-type": "service", "name": "Proof-of-Control Evidence Layer", "description": "Signs each agent action at the moment it occurs, producing tamper-resistant runtime evidence placed on the verification spectrum. The core of tm:poc-cv-standard.", "controls": { "signed-runtime-evidence": { "description": "Tamper-resistant log signed at the moment of each action; exists before any dispute.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:poc-cv-standard", "config": { "std": "std:poc-cv-0.1.0-rev/part2/evidence-properties", "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:signed_evidence" } } ] }, "cryptographic-verification": { "description": "Stage-3 evidence mathematically checkable by any party without trusting the operator.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:poc-cv-standard", "config": { "std": "std:poc-cv-0.1.0-rev/part2/spectrum", "sdg_domain": "provenance", "node": "provenance:crypto_verify" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "trust-key-service", "node-type": "service", "name": "Trust Key Linking Primitive", "description": "Mints portable, offline-verifiable provenance roots with dimensional deep links (poc-hypergraph://). The linking mechanism across every indexed dimension.", "controls": { "hash-linked-cross-reference": { "description": "Cross-reference planes by hash only; no merged super-hash.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "Pattern.TrustKey.ProvenanceKey", "config": { "merge_policy": "hash_linked_cross_reference_only" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "incident-fabric", "node-type": "system", "name": "Private Incident-Response Fabric", "description": "The shared, in-network collaboration surface: seal -> private report -> honor -> emerge. Accretes attributed response patterns and threat intel without exposing raw incident detail.", "controls": { "incident-response-governance": { "description": "Zero-trust incident-response governance for autonomous agents (CSA ATF).", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:csa-atf", "config": { "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:response_playbook" } } ] }, "coordinated-disclosure": { "description": "Timed, attributed disclosure balancing the privacy floor against collective defense.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:owasp-agentic-top10", "config": { "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:disclosure" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "standards-registry", "node-type": "ecosystem", "name": "Standards Anchor Registry", "description": "The trademark-like registry (tm:) of every named standard/community. Each anchor is an authenticated entry point for engagement. Includes tm:finos-calm, tm:finos-aigf, tm:finos-ccc.", "metadata": { "registry": "hypergraph-domain/registry/external-names.yaml" } } ], "relationships": [ { "unique-id": "ciso-files-report", "relationship-type": { "interacts": { "actor": "ciso", "nodes": ["incident-fabric"] } }, "description": "The CISO files a private incident report into the fabric (Hypergraph.Incident.PrivateReport@v1)." }, { "unique-id": "enterprise-runs-agent", "relationship-type": { "composed-of": { "container": "insured-enterprise", "nodes": ["agent-runtime", "tool-gateway", "tee-enclave"] } }, "description": "The insured enterprise deploys the agent runtime behind a tool gateway on confidential compute." }, { "unique-id": "agent-through-gateway", "relationship-type": { "connects": { "source": { "node": "agent-runtime" }, "destination": { "node": "tool-gateway" } } }, "protocol": "mTLS", "description": "Agent tool calls are mediated by the MCP/tool gateway (contains ASI02 tool misuse)." }, { "unique-id": "agent-in-enclave", "relationship-type": { "deployed-in": { "container": "tee-enclave", "nodes": ["agent-runtime"] } }, "description": "The agent executes inside the attested enclave." }, { "unique-id": "runtime-emits-evidence", "relationship-type": { "connects": { "source": { "node": "agent-runtime" }, "destination": { "node": "poc-evidence-layer" } } }, "protocol": "HTTPS", "description": "Every action is signed by the PoC evidence layer at the moment it occurs.", "controls": { "sign-at-action-time": { "description": "Bind evidence to the action before any dispute arises.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:poc-cv-standard", "config": { "std": "std:poc-cv-0.1.0-rev/part2/evidence-properties" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "evidence-minted-into-trustkey", "relationship-type": { "connects": { "source": { "node": "poc-evidence-layer" }, "destination": { "node": "trust-key-service" } } }, "description": "Signed evidence is bound into a Trust Key provenance root with dimensional deep links." }, { "unique-id": "trustkey-into-fabric", "relationship-type": { "connects": { "source": { "node": "trust-key-service" }, "destination": { "node": "incident-fabric" } } }, "description": "Trust Keys carry attributed, privacy-bound incident evidence into the fabric (deep links only)." }, { "unique-id": "insurer-reads-fabric", "relationship-type": { "interacts": { "actor": "insurer", "nodes": ["incident-fabric"] } }, "description": "The insurer underwrites from attributed conformance tiers and response patterns (Hypergraph.Underwrite.ThreatProfile@v1).", "controls": { "underwrite-on-evidence": { "description": "Price AI risk on verifiable evidence, not claim-based assurances.", "requirements": [ { "requirement-url": "tm:aiuc-1", "config": { "sdg_domain": "security", "node": "security:insurer_fabric" } } ] } } }, { "unique-id": "assessor-verifies-trustkey", "relationship-type": { "interacts": { "actor": "assessor", "nodes": ["trust-key-service"] } }, "description": "The assessor verifies Trust Keys offline (Pathways.TrustKey.Verify@v1) - powerful party does least." }, { "unique-id": "fabric-registers-anchors", "relationship-type": { "connects": { "source": { "node": "incident-fabric" }, "destination": { "node": "standards-registry" } } }, "description": "Every control and pattern in the fabric cites a tm: anchor; mentions are tracked by the anchor-name ledger." } ], "flows": [ { "unique-id": "vulnerability-lifecycle", "$ref": "../flows/vulnerability-lifecycle.flow.calm.json" } ] }